More than a Revolution

In 1952 there was a revolution. By 1956 the entire demography of Egypt had changed, as foreigners and Jews were forced out of their homes, businesses were nationalized, and land was redistributed.

When Gamal Abdel Nasser and the rest of the Free Officers movement toppled King Farouk’s government, they were celebrated for ushering in a new era of Egyptian history -- an Egypt to finally be ruled by Egyptians, one that would no longer cow to western pressure. Hosni Mubarak was part of the movement. An Air Force pilot who would rise among the ranks of the new power structure, and become its leader after the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

Why did the celebrated revolution of 1952 end in successive waves of terror? How can Egypt today be guarded against repeating its history?

In comparing the Russian and French revolution, historian Arno Mayer examines the relationship between revolution and terror. He argues that after the height of regime change, the revolutionary fervor often descends into violence, terror, and fury. When viewed this way, a revolution becomes a cycle, rather than a decisive break. There is hopeful celebration, and yet as a new state emerges, it is not free from the battling the same pressures to resume authoritarian rule that it had once fought against. The word revolution, after all, means to move around in a circle.

Egypt today continues its rightful celebration. Mubarak is gone -- something few would have imagined even a month ago. Whatever the spirit that toppled Mubarak from Tahrir Square, and Egypt’s other public spaces -- that is not the only revolutionary impulse that I hope wins the day in Egypt.

At least two kinds of solidarity formed over the last 18 days -- the vocal and public movement for democracy in city squares, as well as the more subtle banding together of neighbors and communities in defense of their homes. The combination of these two movements has led Egypt peacefully into regime change.

If Egypt is to avoid the cycle of revolution into fury and terror, then it has to continue to remain vigilant on both of these fronts. A public demand for democracy must continue, but people must also remain vigilant in the personal relationship to the state. Now that they know they can defend and support themselves, let them also defend themselves against the encroachment of new state power so that Egyptians will refuse to bend to state violence in the name of ‘security.’

Hopefully this will more than a revolution in Egypt, but a transformation.